NATIONAL SECURITY
AND THE PUBLIC'S RIGHT TO KNOW:
A NEW ROLE FOR THE COURTS
UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
For almost two centuries the executive branch of the Government has invoked "national security"' as a justification for
barring public access to government documents. 2 In many cases,
the invocation has been for legitimate reasons. Few would challenge the wisdom or necessity of restricting access to documents
when the national security is truly jeopardized, as for example,
when the confidentiality of ongoing international negotiations
or foreign intelligence operations is imperiled.
Recent years, however, have seen a new and dangerous use
for the national security label: to provide a cover for politically
embarrassing and sometimes illegal government activities. The
transcripts of White House conversations taped during the
Nixon Administration provide a vivid example. By the middle of
March 1973, President Nixon realized that testimony at the Los
Angeles trial of Daniel Ellsberg would inevitably reveal that
White House agents had rifled confidential files in the office of
Ellsberg's psychiatrist. At a March 17 meeting, the President
asked H.R. Haldeman, his Chief of Staff, and John Dean, his
counsel, for advice on how to justify the incident. "You might

I "National security" is a term used frequently by Congress, the courts, and the
President, but it is never clearly defined. Generally its meaning encompasses national
defense and foreign policy issues. While national defense is widely understood to include
the protection of military secrets, foreign policy is a considerably broader concept. It may
or may not include international relations-that is, the day-to-day diplomatic interaction
among nations.
In the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970), as amended, Pub. L.
93-502 (Nov. 21, 1974), 88 Stat. 1561 (1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5758),
Congress refers to "national defense or foreign policy." The President used the language
"'national defense or foreign relations" in the most recent executive order on national
security classification. Exec. Order No. 11,652, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1974). The courts tend not
to distinguish between the components of national security, preferring to treat them
under the general heading of "national security" or "foreign affairs." The subtle differences among interpretations of "national security" are immaterial for purposes of this
Comment. Unless specifically noted, the term "national security" will include national
defense and foreign policy concerns.
2 For a general discussion of the history of national security claims, see FOREIGN
AFFAIRS DIVISION, LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, 92D CONG.,
1ST SESS., SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AS A PROBLEM IN THE CONGRESSIONAL ROLE IN

FOREIGN POLICY 1-4 (Comm. Print 1971) [hereinafter cited as SECURITY CLASSIFICATION].
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put it on a national security grounds basis," Dean answered. The
President apparently liked the suggestion and worked out the
"scenario" with his two advisors:
P-National Security. We had to get information for
national security grounds.
D-Then the question is, why didn't the CIA do it or
why didn't the FBI do it?
P-Because we had to do it on a confidential basis.
H-Because we were checking them.
P-Neither could be trusted.
D-I think we could get by on that.3
Thus it was agreed that the "national security" label would be
used to cloak the government's illegal spying activities. Had the
pressures of continuing investigation of presidential conduct not
forced disclosure of the details of the burglary, the public would
never have learned the relevant information.
To guard against excessive government secrecy, Congress
enacted the Freedom of Information Act 4 (FOIA) in 1966. The
Act is the first comprehensive attempt to promote public access
to government documents. It requires that all agency 5 records,6
except those specifically exempted in subsection (b) of the Act,
be made available to any interested member of the public who
requests them, as long as the request complies with published
rules of procedure. If an agency denies a request for documents,
the Act authorizes a disappointed person to bring suit in federal
court to compel release of the material sought. Although the
FOIA explicitly calls for review de novo of executive decisions to
3 SUBMISSION OF RECORDED PRESIDENTIAL CONVERSATIONS TO THE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES BY PRESIDENT RICHARD M. NIXON 221

(April 30, 1974).
45 U.S.C. § 552 (1970).
5 Although the meaning of the term "agency" under the FOIA was subject to some
dispute, see Soucie v. David, 448 F.2 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971), the recent amendments to the
Act clarify the scope of the term. "Agency" includes any executive department, government corporation, or other establishment in the executive branch, including the Executive Office of the President, or any independent regulatory agency. "Agency" does not
include the President or his immediate personal staff. Pub. L. No. 93-502 (Nov. 21,
1974), 88 Stat. 1561 (1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5758), amending 5 U.S.C. § 552

(1970).
6 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1970) provides for nine exemptions to the FOIA. The exemptions encompass (1) national security matters, (2) internal personnel rules and practices,
(3) statutory exemptions, (4) trade secrets, (5) inter-agency memoranda, (6) matters of
personal privacy, (7) investigatory files, (8) financial institution records, and (9) geological
information concerning wells.
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withhold documents, courts had decided, before the 1974
amendments became effective, that they were powerless to review national security classifications. If the President had ordered a document relating to the Ellsberg case classified without
offering any explanation or justification, the decision would not
have been subject to full judicial scrutiny.
By 1974, Congress recognized the failure of the FOIA to
prevent improper withholding of information by the Government. Responding to pressures created by the Watergate drama'
and to its own sense of the FOIA's inadequacies, 8 last year Congress overrode a presidential veto and enacted amendments designed to close the Act's loopholes and to direct the courts to
play a more decisive enforcement role.
This Comment will explore the scope of the courts' newly
authorized powers under the FOIA amendments; the probable
judicial response to this authorization, given the judiciary's traditional reluctance to intervene in the conduct of foreign affairs;
and the need for a tempering of that reluctance in the interests
of a vigorous, open, and democratic polity.9
I.

THE SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OF CLASSIFIED
DOCUMENTS

A. The Development of Public Access
Until enactment of the FOIA, the public's right of access to
government documents depended almost completely on the discretion of the executive branch. Executive departments were authorized to withhold documents they believed to be sensitive.
Members of the public could not object to any executive decision.
120 CONG. REC. S 19806 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 1974) (remarks of Senator Kennedy).
8 Hearings on H.R. 5425 and H.R. 4960 Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Operationsand

Government Information of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
25 (1973) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings].
' Several of the exemptions provided for in the amendments may have some bearing
on national security litigation under the FOIA. The (b)(3) exemption, for example, which
exempts all material specifically exempted by statute, will be relied upon in suits challenging the withholding of documents by the Central Intelligence Agency. Similarly, the
(b)(7) "investigatory file" exemption may be relevant in cases in which law enforcement
and national security interests overlap. However, the principal exemption for national
security material is the (b)(1) exemption, which covers documents classified pursuant to
the executive order. Since most litigation in this area will arise under the (b)(1) exemption, this Comment will focus on the latter provision in discussing the impact of the
amendments on disclosure of national security information.

NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE FOIA

1975]

The original statutory authority for withholding information was the Housekeeping Statute of 1789,10 which gave executive departments the power to issue regulations pertaining to the
custody, use, and preservation of their records and materials.
The law proved an ideal vehicle for refusing to disclose government documents to private citizens. 1
With the growth of governmental power and bureaucracy in
the New Deal and World War II eras, conflicting drives emerged
to open government up by enlarging public access to agency
documents and to retain control over "national security" information through the classification system. Until 1966 no one attempted to resolve this conflict. National security interests, as
determined by the agencies, almost automatically outweighed the
interest in open government. With the passage of the FOIA the
principles of access and classification were linked. The courts
would have to find a balance between the competing considerations. Judicial construction of the Act, however, left the interests
in place with national security supreme.
1. Public Access
Congress first formulated a general statutory plan to encourage access to agency records in 1946. Section 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act, passed that year, provided for disclosure and publication of agency procedures, opinions, and
records. Disclosure of agency records was not required, however, "to the extent that there is involved.., any function of the
United States requiring secrecy in the public interest.' 1 2 This
exception left considerable room for agencies to maneuver
around the Act, because the determination that the "public interest" demanded "secrecy" was left to the agency itself as a
matter of discretion. The Act did not provide specifically for
judicial review of an agency decision to withhold documents on
"secrecy" grounds.
10Ch. 14, § 7, 1 Stat. 68, as amended, REV. STAT. § 161 (1875), as amended, 5 U.S.C. §
301 (1970).
11 SECURITY CLASSIFICATION, supra note 2, at 6. See also Reynolds v. United States, 192

F.2d 987, 992 (3d Cir. 1951), rev'd, 345 U.S. 1 (1953). In Reynolds, the Air Force relied on
the Housekeeping Statute in its claim of executive privilege.
12 Act of June 11, 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-404, § 3, 60 Stat. 238, as amended, 5 U.S.C.

§ 552 (1970).
The stated congressional intent in enacting § 3 was to open up agency files to the
public. SUBCOMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, SENATE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT SOURCE BOOK: LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS, CASES,
ARTICLES,

S. Doc. No. 82, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1974).
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In 1958 Congress tried to limit an agency's right to withhold
information by amending the ancient Housekeeping Statute.
The amendments provided that the statute could not be used to
withhold information from the public or limit the availability of
agency records. 13 Again the amendments failed to provide for
judicial review or enforcement.
Congress enacted the FOIA as a comprehensive attempt to
set standards for public access to government information, to
limit the areas in which disclosure could be denied, and to provide a remedy for wrongful withholding. The public's right of
access to government files under the FOIA was not absolute,
however. Subsection (b)(1) explicitly exempted material "specifically required by Executive order to be kept secret in the interest
of the national defense or foreign policy."' 4 This exemption recognized the Executive's authority to classify certain information
whose disclosure would threaten the national security.
2. Classification
The practice of classifying documents to prevent their release grew up during World War II. President Roosevelt issued
an executive order directing that information revealing the nature and location of military installations and equipment be protected from disclosure.' 5 The purpose of the order, encompassing military secrets only, was to further the national military
defense. But in the early 1950's, under the pressure of the Cold
War and growing fears of the Communist threat, President
Truman extended the classification system to all information,
military and nonmilitary, whose secrecy was required for national security. The vague terms of the Truman order generated
considerable controversy.' 6 In an effort to counter the criticism,
President Eisenhower refined the classification system in Executive Order 10,50117 by reducing the number of agencies authorized to classify information and simplifying the classification
system.
13 Act of Aug. 12, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-619, 72 Stat. 547, amending REV. STAT. § 161
(1875) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 301 (1970)).
14 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1), as amended, Pub. L. No. 93-502 (Nov. 21, 1974), 88 Stat. 1561
(1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5758).

15Exec. Order No. 8381, 3 C.F.R. 634 (Comp. 1938-1943).
16 Exec. Order No. 10,290, 3 C.F.R. 789 (Comp. 1949-1953). For a general discussion of the history of the executive orders, see HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT
OPERATIONS, EXECUTIVE CLASSIFICATION-PROBLEMS INVOLVING EXEMPTION (b)(1) OF THE
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (5 U.S.C. 552), H.R. REP. No. 221, 93d Cong., Ist Sess.
8-14 (1973) [hereinafter cited as EXECUTIVE CLASSIFICATION].
11Exec. Order No. 10,501, 3 C.F.R. 979 (Comp. 1949-1953).
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President Kennedy further modified Executive Order
10,501 to increase public access.' The classification system remained substantially unchanged until March 1972 when President Nixon responded to controversy over documents classified
pursuant to the orders by issuing Executive Order 11,652,19 the
order operative today. That order seeks to reduce the amount of
classified material, provide means for earlier declassification,
and aid implementation of these goals by the creation of a clas20
sification review committee.
Until enactment of the FOIA, no authority existed under
which classification decisions could be challenged administratively or judicially. The 1966 Act contained, for the first time,
language that seemed to let private citizens seek judicial review
of executive decisions to classify documents. 2 1 Litigants responded to the apparent invitation by bringing suits testing the
scope of agency discretion to classify documents, hoping that the
courts would expand their review of classification decisions. The
courts disappointed those expectations.
B.

Review Under the OriginalFOIA

Epstein v. Resor 22 was the first case to present the issue of the
proper scope of judicial review of an agency's decision to withhold documents under the (b)(1) exemption to the FOIA. In
Epstein, a history professor sought disclosure of documents dealing with the forced repatriation of anti-Communist Russians
after World War II under a program known as "Operation
Keelhaul." The documents were in a file classified "Top Secret,"
but the plaintiff argued that the classification was unwarranted
and that the court should review the contents of the file to make
its own determination about the propriety of the classification.

18 Exec. Order No. 10,964, 3 C.F.R. 486 (Comp. 1959-1963). This executive order
provided for an automatic declassification and downgrading system.
19 Exec. Order No. 11,652, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1974).
11 See generally ExEcUTIvE CLASSIFICATION, supra note 16, at 56-58. See also Note,
Declassificationof Sensitive Information: A Comment on Executive Order 11652, 41 GEO. WASH.
L. REv. 1052 (1973).
21 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1970), as amended, Pub. L. No. 93-502 (Nov. 21, 1974), 88
Stat. 1561 (1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5758), provides:
On complaint, the district court of the United States . . . has jurisdiction to
enjoin the agency from withholding agency records and to order the production
of any agency records improperly withheld from the complainant. In such a case
the court shall determine the matter de novo and the burden is on the agency to
sustain its action.
22 296 F. Supp. 214 (N.D. Cal. 1969), aff'd, 421 F.2d 930 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 398
U.S. 965 (1970).
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The court declined to review the decision to classify the file:
To hold that the agencies have the burden of proving
their action proper even in areas covered by the exemptions, would render the exemption provisions meaningless. If a determination de novo is made by this Court
on whether the top secret classification by the Department of the Army is proper, with the burden on the
Secretary to sustain its action, the court would be giving
identical treatment to information withheld by2 3 an
agency whether it fell within the exemption or not.
With this reasoning, the court rendered meaningless the FOIA
provision granting the courts jurisdiction to review agency decisions de novo. 24 A brief incantation of any of the nine statutory
exemptions 2 5 would release the agency from accountability. The
district court held that it would conduct only a limited review, to
determine whether the agency classification was "clearly arbitrary and unsupportable. ' 6 The court then found, on the basis
of affidavits rather than inspection of the documents themselves,
that the classification was appropriate.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, even
though it recognized that the decision of the lower court was too
broad. The court of appeals restricted the decision to section
(b)(1) on the theory that the exemption therein is "significantly
different from the other exemptions. 21 7 The practical effect was
to endorse the lower court's restrictive holding on the scope of
review of national security classifications.
Nine months after Epstein and twenty-three years after the
Army's creation of the "Operation Keelhaul" file, the Army
downgraded the file's classification from "Top Secret" to "Confidential." The following year a White House aide stated that
"[t]he United States Government has absolutely no objection...
to the declassification and release of the 'Operation Keelhaul'
files."2 8 This rather ironic postcript to the Epstein decision suggests that the documents were classified improperly at the time
suit was brought; and that the case might have come out differ296 F. Supp. at 217.
24 5 U.S.G. § 552(a)(3) (1970).
25See note 6 supra.
26 296 F. Supp. at 217.
27 421 F.2d at 933.
2

28 Letter from Associate Counsel to the President to Plaintiff, October 22, 1970, cited
in Wolfe v. Froehlke, 358 F. Supp. 1318, 1319 n.1 (D.D.C. 1973), aff'd, 510 F.2d 654
(D.C. Cir. 1974).
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ently had the court examined them in29camera or at least required
the Army to justify the classification.
Nevertheless the courts continued to decline review of
documents withheld under the national security exemption. Besides lowering the standard of review, the courts limited the
scope of review by evincing reluctance to examine the contents
of contested documents. In Moss v. Laird,3 0 Congressman John
Moss sought the release of the forty-seven-volume History of U.S.
Decision-Making Process on Vietnam Policy (the Pentagon Papers)
after the Defense Department refused to disclose the documents.
In upholding the Pentagon's decision, Judge Gesell noted that
the Pentagon had reviewed the volumes fully earlier that year
and declassified large portions already published in newspapers
and in book form. Sworn affidavits were submitted to the court
which suggested that disclosure of portions still classified would
compromise American defense arrangements, military plans, diplomatic negotiations, and intelligence strategies. 3 l Citing Epstein
v. Resor, the court found in camera inspection unnecessary and
32
inappropriate.
The issue of the propriety of in camera perusal of documents
withheld by reliance on the (b)(1) exemption was settled by the
Supreme Court in EPA v. Mink.3 3 Justice White stated for the
Court that Congress specifically precluded judicial inspection of
the contents of classified documents:
We do not believe that Exemption 1 permits compelled
disclosure of documents . . . that were classified pursuant to this Executive Order. Nor does the Exemption
permit in camera inspection of such documents to sift
out so-called "nonsecret components." Obviously, this
test was not the only alternative available. But Congress
chose to follow the Executive's determination in these
34
matters and that choice must be honored.

29

A second attempt was made to procure disclosure of the "Operation Keelhaul"

files in Wolfe v. Froehlke, 358 F. Supp. 1318 (D.D.C. 1973), affd, 510 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir.
1974). The Army again refused disclosure, this time on foreign policy grounds because the British, with whom the file had been jointly created, did not agree to declassification. The Army's decision was upheld. See text accompanying notes 105 & 106

infra.
1o Civil No. 1254-71 (D.D.C., Dec. 7, 1971).
31 Id. at 2.
32 Id. at 3.
33 410 U.S. 73 (1973).
4
3 1d. at 81.
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Relying in part on the language of the (b)(1) exemption, which
provided that matters "specifically required by Executive Order"
to remain secret need not be disclosed, the Court reasoned that
once a document was classified no further inquiry into its contents could be made. The "de novo" review requirement applied
only to the other eight enumerated exemptions.
Although the Court's holding was not entirely clear, its
analysis suggested that even the limited review for arbitrariness
of Epstein may have been impermissible. Judicial limitations on
judicial review, first by Epstein's restriction of the scope of the
inquiry and then in Mink by curtailment of the means of review
available to the courts, produced predictable results. The resulting case law contained challenges to the efficacy of the FOIA,
the credibility of the Excutive, and the reliability of the judiciary.
C. Results Under the OriginalFOIA
As construed by the courts, the original FOIA failed to
guarantee ready public access to information pertinent to critical
public issues. In Mink itself, Congresswoman Patsy Mink sought
release of documents that supposedly justified the decision to
conduct a nuclear test known as "Cannikin" on Amchitka Island,
Alaska. Her request was denied. As a result, the growing debate
over the widsom of conducting the test was silenced. After the
explosion, almost all the materials sought by the plaintiffs in
Mink were released to the public. The disclosure of the documents severely undercuts the Executive's position that the
documents had to be withheld for national security reasons. The
more plausible explanation is that the Executive wanted to avoid
controversy by suppressing any information that would have
strengthened the case of the opposition. 5
Misuse of the national security exemption also occurred in
Aspin v. Department of Defense, 36 in which Congressman Les Aspin
sought release of the Peers Commission Report on the My Lai
incident in Vietnam. The Army refused to release the report,
citing as authority four different exemptions in the FOIA.3 7 The
(b)(1) national security exemption was not among them. The
'- House Hearings,supra note 8, at 87.
36 491

F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1973).

37 Letter from Robert W. Berry, General Counsel, to Congressman Aspin, March 1,

1972, on file in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The four
exemptions cited as a basis for withholding the reports were: (1) confidential information-(b)(4); (2) intra-agency memorandum-(b)(5); (3) personal privacy-(b)(6); and (4)
investigatory file-(b)(7).
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Army raised the (b)(1) objection only after Congressman Aspin
filed suit, and then in conjunction with an argument that in
camera review was inappropriate.3 8 Shortly after Lieutenant William Calley, Jr., the platoon leader at My Lai and the sole participant convicted of any My Lai wrongdoing, was released from
jail, the Army released the Peers Commission Report. 39 The release of the document as soon as the investigatory file exemption
no longer applied, without further declassification, suggests that
the Army only invoked the (b)(1) exemption to avoid in camera
review under Mink.4 °
By the spring of 1973 Congress had become aware of the
problems of the FOIA as it then existed. The Nixon Administration was subjecting the national security label to abuse, the courts
hesitated to expand their own scope of review, and the Supreme
Court had hinted in Mink that an appropriate solution would
have to come from the legislative branch.4 ' Congress accepted
the challenge and proceeded to search for a remedy.
D. The New Legislation
The FOIA amendments enacted in November 1974 authorize the courts to inspect in camera documents classified pursuant to an executive order. They also provide for de novo review of agency decisions to withhold requested material.42 The

"8
See Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment at 6, Aspin v. Dep't of Defense, 491 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or
in the Alternative for Summary Judgment at 14-15. Id. The trial court's opinion did not
mention the issue at all, and the court of appeals found it unnecessary to rule on the
question. Aspin v. Dep't of Defense, 348 F. Supp. 1081 (D.D.C. 1972), aff'd, 491 F.2d 24
(D.C. Cir. 1973).
39N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1974, at 16, col. 4.
40 A third case demonstrating the need for judicial review of classification decisions is
Consumers Union v. Peterson, Civil No. 131-73 (D.D.C.,Jan. 22, 1973). Consumers Union
requested disclosure of a Department of Commerce document concerned with the formulation of textile import policy and administration. The Department of Commerce
contended that disclosure was not required because of the (b)(1) exemption. At that time
the document was classified "confidential." The Department of Commerce later agreed
in a settlement to declassify and release the document. Letter from Eldon V.C. Greenberg to Congressman Moorhead, May 24, 1973, in House Hearings, supra note 8, at
361-63. The guidelines set forth in the document are of a most general nature, whose
disclosure could not conceivably have compromised the nation's security or foreign policy. See Recommended General Policy Guidelinesfor Third Year of the Long Term Agreement, in
House Hearings,supra note 8, at 363-64. If the Commerce Department had not agreed to
settle the case, the courts would not have compelled disclosure under the FOIA as it then
existed and was interpreted.
41 See text accompanying note 34 supra.
42 Pub. L. No. 93-502 (Nov. 21, 1974), 88 Stat. 1561 (1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 5758), amending 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970).
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legislative history of the amendments reveals Congress' unmistakable intent to encourage the courts to become actively involved in security classification decisions.
Both the Senate and the House held extensive hearings on
the proposals to overule Mink by amending the FOIA. The bill
reported out of the Senate Judiciary Committee a year after
Mink made two substantial changes in the existing national security exemption. 4 3 First, the Senate bill explicitly required that
material could be withheld under the (b)(1) exemption only if a
court determined that the documents bore a national security
stamp and that the stamp was correctly applied. 44 The mere fact
of classification would not terminate the court's inquiry. The
court would also be obliged to consider the justification offered
by the agency for its decision to classify the documents.
By requiring that documents be properly classified "in fact",
the Senate bill dramatically increased the role of the courts in
enforcement of the FOIA. The authority to classify documents
would no longer rest exclusively in the agency's discretion, but
would be shared with the courts. But the question of the degree
of judicial participation remained unanswered.
The bill's second major change, the subject of considerable
debate, related to this issue of degree. The Senate bill as reported out of committee established new procedures and standards which the courts were to follow in exercising their new
authority to review agency classification decisions. The bill authorized in camera review of contested documents when courts
were unable to resolve the matter on the basis of affidavits submitted by the parties. If, however, the head of an agency filed an
affidavit certifying that he had examined the documents and
determined that disclosure was improper, the court would be
obligated to uphold the agency decision unless in camera inspection revealed no reasonable basis for the decision.4 5
11 S. 2543, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(a) (1974), was reported out on May 16, 1974, S.
REP. No. 855, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
14 S. 2543, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), provided: "Section 552(b)(1) of title 5, United
States Code, is amended to read as follows: '(1) specifically required by an Executive
order or statute to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and
are in fact covered by such order or statute .... '" (emphasis supplied).
15 S. 2543, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § l(b)(2) (1974) provided:
If there has been filed in the record an affidavit by the head of the agency
certifying that he has personally examined the documents withheld and has
determined after such examination that they should be withheld under the
criteria established by a statute or Executive order referred to in subsection
(b)(1) of this section, the court shall sustain such withholding unless, following its
in camera examination it finds the withholding is without a reasonable basis
under such criteria.
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The courts, in sum, would be authorized to inspect documents withheld pursuant to the national security exemption, but
review would be limited to a "reasonableness" standard. Senator
Hruska explained that the "reasonable basis" test would prevent
a judge from substituting his understanding of a document's
sensitive nature for that of the agency.4 6 The Senate bill, then,
would not have substantially altered the role played by courts
under the then-existing statutory and case law. In both Epstein v.
Resor 47 and Moss v. Laird48 the court recognized that the decision
to classify was reviewable for arbitrariness. Whether this minimal
review survived the Supreme Court's decision in Mink4 9 is open
to some question. If it did, the bill would only have expanded
the scope of review a little further; if it did not, the bill would
have revived and broadened the pre-Mink rule. In either case,
the courts would still have been unable to redetermine de novo
the proper security classification of contested documents.
On the Senate floor, Senator Muskie proposed an amendment that broadened substantially the scope of judicial review.
The Muskie amendment prevailed, and Congress enacted it over
a presidential veto which was motivated in part by opposition to
the amendment. 50 The amendment eliminated the section on
procedures and the "reasonable basis" standard.5 1 The judiciary,
Muskie had argued, is fully capable of making intelligent decisions in the area of national defense without being restricted by
Congress:
By telling judges so specifically how to manage their
inquiry into the propriety of a classification marking, we
show a strange contempt for their ability to devise procedures on their own to help them reach a just decision.
Moreover, by giving classified material a status unlike
that of any other claimed Government secret, we foster
the outworn myth that only those in possession of military and diplomatic confidences can have the expertise

46

120 CONG.

REC.

S9326 (daily ed. May 30, 1974) (remarks of Senator Hruska).

47 421 F.2d 930 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970).
48 Civil No. 1254-71 (D.D.C., Dec. 7, 1971).
49 EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973).

50 10 WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 1318 (1974) ("Veto of
Freedom of Information Act Amendments," Oct. 17, 1974) [hereinafter cited as VETO
MESSAGEJ.
51 Senator

Ervin summed up congressional sentiment: "The ground ought to be not
whether a man has reached a wrong decision reasonably or unreasonably. It ought to be
whether he has reached a wrong decision." 120 CONG. REc. S9326 (daily ed. May 30,
1974) (remarks of Senator Ervin).
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share

their

The final version of the legislation embodies the position
advocated by Senator Muskie. The law now explicitly requires de
novo review for all materials withheld on national security
grounds, and permits in camera inspection at the court's
discretion. 53 It also expands the courts' scope of review by changing the language of the (b)(1) national security exemption to
cover material "specifically authorized under criteria established by
an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national
defense or foreign policy and . . . in fact properly classified
pursuant to such Executive order. ' 54 This new language directs
the court to use the criteria set forth by the Executive as a standard for judging the propriety of the agency's determination.
The Conference Report55 makes clear that the court must consider
both procedural and substantive criteria contained in the executive order or statute, though still attributing substantial weight to
the agency's affidavit concerning details of the classification decision.
Congress' intent in passing the new legislation, then, was to
encourage the courts to play a more substantial role in FOIA
cases. The national defense or foreign policy exemption should
be treated like all other exemptions. The legislation does not
direct courts to disregard agency decisions or an agency's
reasons for its decision; it only removes the presumption in the
agency's favor. Based on all the information presented, a court
must reach its own independent judgment, a far cry from the
situation before 1974 when courts were denied information 56and
asked to abstain from reaching any kind of judgment at all.
52

Id. S9319 (remarks of Senator Muskie).

53The law provides that the district court has jurisdiction to enjoin an agency from

withholding records:
In such a case the court shall determine the matter de novo, and may examine
the contents of such agency records in camera to determine whether such records or any part thereof shall be withheld under any of the exemptions set forth
in subsection (b) of this section, and the burden is on the agency to sustain its
action.
Pub. L. No. 93-502 § (b)(2) (Nov. 21, 1974), 88 Stat. 1561 (1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 5758), amending 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970).
54Pub. L. No. 93-502, § 2(a) (Nov. 21, 1974), 88 Stat. 1561 (1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 5758), amending 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970) (emphasis supplied).
55H.R. REP. No. 1380, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1974).
56Evidence of Congressional intent to encourage judicial scrutiny of the
Government's national security claims can also be found in the legislative history of the
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, Pub. L. No. 93-595 (Jan. 2, 1975), 88 Stat. 1926 (1974 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1) (special pamphlet no. 12A), enacted two months after the
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II.

THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO THE FOIA
AMENDMENTS: HERITAGE OF HESITATION

The 1974 FOIA amendments, as yet untouched by judicial
construction, invite the courts to delve into the national security
classification system. The invitation, however, is not a command.
By refusing to employ the discretionary powers granted, by
reading the statute narrowly, or by raising questions of justiciability, the courts could decline to accept the role envisioned for
them by the legislature.
Will the courts be willing to confront the executive branch
on the uncertain territory of foreign affairs and national defense? Only months after enactment of the amendments, it is too
early to answer the question definitively. But it is possible to
define the possibilities by looking at other areas of the law in
which executive agencies have submitted national security claims
to courts to justify agency action. In four areas, cases have raised
the kinds of issues that can be expected to arise under the FOIA
amendments. In cases involving the judicial review provisions of
the Administrative Procedure Act, claims of executive privilege,
wiretap and surveillance authorizations, and the FOIA before its
amendment, courts have been reluctant to overrule agency decisions. This reluctance may portend unwillingness to accept the
latest mandate from Congress.
A. The Administrative ProcedureAct
The Administrative Procedure Act 57 (APA) provides for
judicial review of decisions made by administrative agencies. Although the Act does not specifically prohibit review of any particular subject, it has been interpreted to preclude review of
foreign affairs decisions. Professor Davis argues that section
701(a)(2) of the Act, precluding judicial review of agency action
FOIA amendments. The rules as drafted by the Advisory Committee included a state
secret privilege (rule 509), which was substantially the same as the FOIA (b)(1) exemption. Before the rules were sent to Congress, the Court amended the state secret
privilege, on the urging of the Justice Department, to expand the definition of state
secret and limit the courts' role in evaluating the Government's claim. Hearings on Proposed Rules of Evidence Before the Special Subcomm. on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws of the
House Comm. on theJudiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 181-85 (1973).
The proposed rule met with considerable opposition in Congress. The rule would
have conflicted with the basic purpose of the FOIA amendments, even though its use
would arise in a different context from the FOIA. The latter were designed to expand
rather than contract the courts' authority to review national security claims. The rule was
eliminated from the version ultimately enacted.
For a general discussion of the rule and its legislative history, see id. 181-85 (1973).
57 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59 (1970).
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to the extent that the latter "is committed to agency discretion by
law,' '5 8 excludes certain subjects from judicial consideration; and
59
foreign policy questions usually fall into this excluded category.
On the other hand, section 706(2)(A) of the APA provides
that the scope of judicial review of agency action shall include a
determination whether the agency has abused its discretion. 60 By
reading the two provisions together, Professor Raoul Berger
concludes that all decisions are reviewable, except that decisions
committed to agency discretion are reviewable only for abuse of
61
discretion.
The debate between Davis and Berger is partly a linguistic
controversy over the intent of the APA, a debate not relevant to
the FOIA. But it is also a dispute over the propriety of judicial
review in the foreign affairs context. The substance of the debate is reflected in the decision of the United States Court of
62
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Curran v. Laird,
with the majority of the court adopting the Davis approach and
the minority following Berger.
In Curran, the maritime union brought an action under the
Cargo Preference Act,6 3 challenging an executive decision to use
foreign vessels to transport American military cargo. The Act
prohibited such use unless equivalent American ships were unavailable. The maritime union argued that ships in the national
defense reserve fleet were available, and that the Act required
their use before resort to foreign ships. The Department of Defense claimed the ultimate authority to decide, in the interest of
national defense, whether the reserve fleet should be used to
transport cargo. In short, the Department claimed that the question of "availability" had been committed exclusively to its discretion by law. The court agreed with the Pentagon and refused to
64
review the decision.
In dissent, Judge Skelly Wright argued that the Executive
must consider the policy behind the Cargo Preference Act-the
protection of American seamen-in determining whether the re58 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1970).
59 Davis, Administrative Arbitrariness--A Final Word, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 814 (1966).
Professor Davis' position is that it would be impractical to let courts review all administrative action. He cites a series of examples to bolster his argument, many of which raise
foreign affairs problems. Id. 821-33.
60 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1970).
61Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness and Judicial Review, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 55
(1965).
62 420 F.2d 122 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
63 10 U.S.C. § 2631 (1970).
64 420 F.2d at 131.
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serve fleet was "available" for use. Following Professor Berger's
analysis, he argued that the Executive's decision should be reviewed for abuse of discretion. To avoid the need for case-bya
case analysis, the dissent suggested that the Executive publish
65
arise.
might
that
cases
all
covering
broad policy statement
The relevance of Curranto the FOIA lies not in its interpretation of the conflicting APA provisions on judicial review, but
rather in its analysis of the court's role in national defense. The
majority and the dissent agreed that the court's function is limited when national security issues are involved. But while the
dissent would permit circumscribed review, the majority found
review inappropriate: "[T]he particular issues," said the court,
"call for determinations that lie outside sound judicial domain in
66
terms of aptitudes, facilities, and responsibility.
The Davis approach, as adopted by the Curran court, not
only limits the scope of judicial review but denies the very availability of judicial review. The court based its decision on its perception of the proper judicial function in the foreign affairs
area. The court's rationale applies only indirectly to the declassification context, but it suggests that in national security cases,
the courts are likely to adhere to the traditional model ofjudicial
deference to the Executive, instead of exercising the new discretion that is theirs under the FOIA amendments.
B. Invocation of Executive Privilege
During the course of ordinary litigation, private parties may
need access to government documents to prove their cases. If the
material sought contains sensitive information which the Government does not wish to disclose, then the Executive will interpose a claim of privilege. Resolving the conflict between the
litigant's interest in obtaining pertinent and even necessary information and the Government's interest in preserving sensitive
material is a task for which the courts are well suited.
The "state secrets" privilege has long been recognized by the
judiciary. 67 When the courts are confronted with the claim, they
usually respect the Executive's decision without in camera inspection of the contested material. 68 This is another indication that
65Id. at 142 (Wright, J., dissenting).
66Id. at 129. See also text accompanying notes 107-56 infra.
67 See, e.g., Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875); Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B.
Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318 (D.D.C. 1966), aff'd sub nom. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena v.
Clark, 384 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 952 (1967).
68See, e.g., United States v. Haugen, 58 F. Supp. 436 (E.D. Wash. 1944); Pollen v.
Ford Instrument Co., 26 F. Supp. 583 (E.D.N.Y. 1939); Firth Sterling Co. v. Bethlehem
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courts might be reluctant to exercise their expanded power over
declassification cases under the amended FOIA.
In United States v. Reynolds,6 9 the plaintiffs, widows of civilian
observers who were killed in an Air Force test flight, moved for
production of the Air Force's official accident investigation report. The Government moved to quash on the ground that the
material could not be supplied without seriously damaging the
national security. It asserted the evidentiary privilege of military
secrets, as codified in an Air Force regulation. The court recognized its obligation to determine the appropriate scope of the
claimed privilege. It sustained the withholding of the records,
however, on the basis of only a formal claim of privilege, a supporting affidavit, and judicial notice of the contemporaneous
"vigorous preparation for national defense."7 0
The Court declined to order inspection of ihe d-6cuments in
camera, but noted that the relative necessity of obtaining the evidence would determine the depth of its probe of a claim of
privilege.7 1 The Government had offered to produce three surviving crewmen for examination on non-classified matters, and
the Court found that their testimony would obviate the need for
immediate production of the report. The Reynolds Court may
have reached the correct result, but it should have looked at the
documents to be sure. The case also suggests that courts may
seize upon the existence of other evidence when they want to
defer to the Executive by not ordering production of documents
even for in camera inspection.
In another case involving mixed claims of executive
privilege and national security, the District of Columbia Circuit
also declared that the lower court should investigate claims of
privilege, but avoided requiring in camera inspection of the "national security" documents involved. In Committeefor Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg,72 plaintiffs challenged the adequacy of
an environmental impact statement prepared by the Atomic
Energy Commission pursuant to the National Environmental
Steel Co., 199 F. 353 (E.D. Pa. 1912). But see Halpern v. United States, 258 F.2d 36 (2d
Cir. 1958); Cresmer v. United States, 9 F.R.D. 203 (E.D.N.Y. 1949) (contested documents
required to be submitted to the court for in camera inspection). In Cresmer the court
inspected the documents, found no state secrets in them, and ordered the government to
disclose the material.
69 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
70

1d. at 10.

1

1Id. at 11.
72 463 F.2d 788 (D.C. Cir. 1971). The plaintiffs in Committee for Nuclear Responsibility

challenged the nuclear test that was also the subject of dispute in EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S.
73 (1973).
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Policy Act"3 (NEPA). They sought discovery of certain agency
memoranda which criticized the decision to conduct a nuclear
test because of its potentially adverse environmental impact. The
Government refused to disclose the memoranda on executive
privilege grounds. The basis of the claim of privilege was that
the materials requested contained intra-executive advisory opinions and recommendations whose confidentiality was necessary
to protect the integrity of the executive decisonmaking process.
The court rejected the Government's argument that the
Executive's determination that documents are protected by
privilege is conclusive, holding that the applicability of the
privilege must be determined by the district court. The court
concluded that in camera inspection of the7 4 contested documents
was proper in making that determination.
Just as the court in Reynolds declined to inspect documents
that concerned national security matters, so in Committeefor Nuclear Responsibility the court declined to inspect portions of documents that concerned national security matters. The court affirmed an order requiring the Government to submit the contested documents for in camera inspection after excising material
containing military or diplomatic secrets. 75 The court did not
require that these allegedly sensitive portions of the documents
be turned over to the court, leaving to the Executive the crucial
decision of what constituted national security information without any judicial review. In camera inspection was ordered only of
the nonsensitive environmental documents.
The question of the courts' proper role in deciding the
scope of executive privilege arose recently in connection with the
Watergate Special Prosecutor's efforts to obtain taped White
House conversations relevant to investigation of the Watergate
scandal. The District of Columbia Circuit held that in camera
inspection of the tapes was necessary. 76 The court went so far as
to authorize review of a claim of privilege based on national
security:
In so far as the President makes a claim that certain
material may not be disclosed because the subject matter relates to national defense or foreign relations, he
may decline to transmit that portion of the material and

73 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (1970).
74 463 F.2d at 792-95.
75Id. at 790-91.
76 Nixon

v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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in camera
ask the District Court to reconsider whether
77
inspection of the material is necessary.
Although the court recognized the validity of in camera review, it
contemplated that the lower court would order in camera inspection less readily when the Executive based his claim on national
security than when he based it on the need to preserve the confidentiality of the executive decisionmaking process. If the court
found the claim of privilege unsupported, it could order production of the documents for in camera inspection. The court left the
standard for determining the validity of the claim undefined,
however.
The Supreme Court has intimated that mere claims of national security will preclude in camera inspection. In United States
v. Nixon, 78 the Court left open this possibility while affirming a
court's power to review executive privilege claims resting on the
need for confidential communications:
Absent a claim of need to protect military, diplomatic, or sensitive national security secrets, we find it difficult to accept
the argument that even the very important interest in
confidentiality of Presidential communications is significantly diminished by production of such material for
in camera inspection. ....s
As Professor Van Alstyne has suggested, the Court offered an
"oblique invitation to the President to throttle judicial review by
presenting a claim of executive privilege in the cellophane wrapper of 'national security.' "80
The lesson that can be drawn from these cases is that even
when the courts are faced with claims of state secret privilege
that they are not prohibited from reviewing, they are reluctant
to undertake in camera inspection. Although the courts have consistently held that it is their job to determine the appropriate
scope of the privilege, they tend to defer to the Executive's determination when the claim of privilege rests on national security
grounds.
The courts may adopt a similarly cautious approach in cases
under the FOIA amendments. Without considerable provocation, courts will not be likely to shed their excessive respect for
77Id. at 721.
78 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
79Id.at 706 (emphasis supplied).
80 Van Alstyne, A Political and Constitutional Review of United States v. Nixon, 22

U.C.L.A. L. REV. 116, 117 (1974).

1975)

NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE FOIA

the executive privilege doctrine. Given that respect, it is unlikely
that courts will demand in camera inspection of classified documents except in the most clear-cut cases of misuse of the
privilege. Even when the courts order in camera inspection of
classified documents, they will probably seldom overturn the
decision of the agency.
C.

Wiretap Cases

The courts' approach in electronic surveillance cases may
also illuminate current judicial attitudes toward inspection of
documents bearing on national security matters. In most cases,
the fourth amendment requires that the government seek prior
judicial approval in the form of a warrant before conducting a
search. 8 ' The courts have carved out exceptions to the warrant
requirement: in certain limited circumstances a warrantless
search does not violate the fourth amendment. 82 On several occasions the Government has claimed that electronic surveillance
conducted for national security purposes qualifies as an exception to the warrant requirement, with mixed results in the
courts.
The Government did not prevail in United States v. United

States District Court.8 3 There the Government argued that a warrantless wiretap of the defendants was proper because the purpose of the surveillance was to gather intelligence information
needed to protect the national security. The Government relied
on the language of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act, 84 which authorizes court-approved electronic
surveillance for specific crimes but also provides that nothing in
the Act is intended to limit the President's constitutional powers
to protect against the overthrow of the government. 85 The Gov-

ernment argued that requiring a warrant would inhibit the
President's ability to protect the nation from internal subversion,
that the judiciary lacked expertise in national security matters,
that Congress recognized this problem by providing in the Act
for warrantless searches in some cases, and that therefore national security wiretaps should be excepted from the warrant
requirement.
81See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
82 See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (search incident to arrest);
United States v. Harris, 390 U.S. 234 (1968) (plain view); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S.
294 (1967) (hot pursuit).
83407 U.S. 297 (1972).
84 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (1970).
85 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3) (1970).
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In an opinion written by Justice Powell, the Court rejected
the Government's statutory argument. Congress, the Court concluded, had taken a neutral position on the question of the need
for a warrant in national security cases. 8 6 Although the President
is obligated to protect the national security, his constitutional
function would not be hampered by requiring prior judicial approval of domestic security surveillance. In balancing the
Executive's need to prevent internal subversion against the need
to protect privacy and free expression, the Court concluded that
the Government must obtain a warrant before conducting any
domestic electronic surveillance. The fourth amendment
guarantee against unreasonable searches could not be ensured if
domestic security wiretaps could be conducted solely at the dis87
cretion of the Executive.
Eschewing the exclusivity of executive expertise, the Court
declared that federal courts are fully competent to deal with
cases involving national security:
There is no reason to believe that federal judges will be
insensitive to or uncomprehending of the issues involved in domestic security cases. Certainly courts can
recognize that domestic security surveillance involves
different considerations from the surveillance of "ordinary crime." If the threat is too subtle or complex for
our senior law enforcement officers to convey its significance to a court, one may question whether there is
probable cause for surveillance. 88
Thus the Court refused to create a blanket exception to the
warrant requirement for all national security cases. The decision
in United States v. United States District Court demonstrates that the
Supreme Court is prepared to see the federal courts play an
active role in scrutinizing government claims of national security
when the claims are invoked at the expense of personal freedoms.
By analogy, the courts should be prepared to exercise their
new powers of review under the FOIA amendments. The courts
may attempt to distinguish District Court because it involved a
balancing of fundamental constitutional rights, whereas claims
under the FOIA are only statutory claims to be sacrificed in the
interest of national security. The statutory basis of the right of
86407 U.S. at 306-08.
87 Id. at 316-17.
88 Id. at 320.
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access, however, should not detract from that right's importance
as a contribution to the constitutional scheme of self-government.
Essential to such a scheme is continual access to social, political, esthetic, and moral experiences and ideas. 8 9 To deprive the
public of the factual basis of such ideas is to curtail robust and
free debate, the goal of the first amendment protection of
speech. The rights secured by the FOIA, while not absolutely
mandated by the Constitution, further the purposes of the Bill
of Rights and should not be easily overborn, even by the
Government's invocation of national security.
Even if one accepts that the statutory/constitutional distinction does not destroy the analogy, District Court may be irrelevant
to cases involving foreign affairs under the FOIA. In District
Court, the Supreme Court deliberately limited itself to the question of domestic surveillance. The Court carefully reserved the
question of the scope of the Executive's power to monitor the
activities of foreign governments, both within and outside the
country. 90 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit confronted the issue in United States v. Butenko9' in which the defendants were charged with conspiring to transmit national defense
information to a foreign government. The Government justified
having conducted electronic surveillance without a warrant
under District Court because foreign intelligence rather than
domestic security was at issue.
A majority of the court agreed with the Government, holding that surveillance conducted for the purpose of gathering
foreign intelligence information constitutes an exception to the
fourth amendment's warrant requirement. 92 The court found
that judicial intervention in the surveillance process would frustrate the Executive's conduct of foreign affairs by threatening to
interfere with the continuous flow of intelligence information.9 3
The fourth amendment only requires judicial review of the
reasonableness of the wiretap subesequent to the surveillance,
and then only in certain situations, such as the trial of the subject
8See

Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
90 407 U.S. at 308. But see Russo v. Bryne, 409 U.S. 1219 (Douglas, Circuit Justice,
1972), where Justice Douglas refused to distinguish between foreign and domestic surveillance, claiming that prior decisions drew no such lines. The issue remained unresolved.
9, 494 F.2d 593 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 147 (1974).
92 494 F.2d at 605. The purpose of the wiretap in Butenko had been to prevent the
illegal dissemination of sensitive information, not to gather foreign intelligence information, but the court saw no reason to treat the two situations differently. Id. at n.51.
93 Id. at 602-03.
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of surveillance on the basis of information obtained by the contested wiretap. The amendment does not require prior approval
of surveillance by the courts.
The court's holding was considerably broader than was
necessary. As Judge Gibbons pointed out in dissent, 94 the court
could have examined the precise circumstances of the case to
determine whether an emergency made it impossible for the
Government to secure a warrant. Instead, the court created a
broad exception for all foreign intelligence cases, whether or not
the government could have obtained a warrant before commencing surveillance. As in the executive privilege cases, 9 5 the court
evinced an inclination to defer to the Executive.
District Court and Butenko, taken together, indicate that
courts are more wary of scrutinizing national security claims
when foreign affairs issues are implicated than when domestic
security alone is at stake. This self-imposed limitation on judicial
review in the surveillance area may be adopted by the courts in
cases arising under the FOIA. The degree to which foreign affairs issues complicate the request for disclosure is likely to be a
factor that courts weigh in the balance when they consider
whether in camera review is appropriate.
D. FOIA Cases Priorto Amendment of the Act
A central feature of the 1974 FOIA amendments is that the
authorization for in camera inspection of contested documents is
permissive rather than mandatory. 9 6 Addressing the merits of
the classification system to determine whether a classification is
"in fact" proper requires, in critical cases, analysis of the actual
content of the contested documents. Refusal to gaze upon the
forbidden papers may be judicial abdication of ultimate responsibility. The courts' willingness to exercise their discretionary
powers may determine the effectiveness of the amendments.
An examination of the FOIA cases decided before the
amendments became effective reveals an attitude of judicial caution that goes beyond the bare language of the Act. In cases
involving documents bearing a national security stamp, the
courts not only narrowed the scope of review to whether the
94 Id. at 637 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).

95 See text accompanying notes 67-80 supra.
The original bill considered by the Senate, S. 1142, and the original bill considered
by the House, H.R. 5425, provided for mandatory in camera review by federal courts
whenever the Government made a claim under the (b)(1) exemption. The bills that
eventually were debated by the two Houses on the floor, S. 2543 and H.R. 12471, gave
the courts the power to examine documents in camera.
96
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administrative decision was arbitrary and capricious; 97 they also
confined themselves to minimal in camera inspection of contested
classified documents. In Soucie v. David,9 8 for instance, the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit instructed the
district court to avoid handling the actual documents themselves.
The court of appeals noted that in camera perusal of documents
might be necessary, but only if the Government's description of
the documents did not satisfy the court of the claim's
justification.9" Even absent a statutory constraint, the court was
willing to curtail judicial rumaging through classified documents.
Similarly, in Moss v. Laird'00 the court indicated that in
camera perusal of contested documents, even if not prohibited by
the Act, would not be "desirable." In camera inspection, said the
court, would require that a substantial portion of the litigation
take place in secret, with the judge forced to rely on extensive ex
parte briefings on matters beyond the court's competence. The
party seeking disclosure would effectively be excluded from the
process. Such a departure from normal courtroom procedure,
the court concluded, could be allowed only in the most compelling circumstances. 01
Congress apparently shared Judge Gesell's concern in Moss
that in camera review might deprive the litigating party of the
opportunity to challenge the government's showing. Yet Congress overrode its concerns and passed the amendments, confident that the problems could be remedied. From the outset,
Congress took the position in its deliberation on the FOIA
amendments that ex parte proceedings should be the exception
rather than the rule.10 2 Courts were to be encouraged to hear
argument in open court or in chambers with both parties present; exclusion of the plaintiff's counsel was to occur only when
his presence would itself pose a serious threat to national
security.10 3 In cases necessitating ex parte presentations, Congress
suggested that courts require the Government to file a
memorandum, whenever possible, explaining its decision to
withhold the material, thereby affording plaintiff's counsel an
opportunity to respond. 0 4 Whether these assurances and sug-

"

See notes 22-34 supra and accompanying text.
98448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
99Id. at 1079-80.
10 Civil No. 1254-71 (D.D.C., Dec. 7, 1971).
101Id. at 3. Cf. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
102 S. REP. No. 854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 14-15 (1974).
103 120 CONG. REc. S9313 (daily ed. May 30, 1974) (remarks of Senator Kennedy).
104 S. REP. No. 854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1974). See also Hearings on S. 1142 Before
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gestions of Congress will alleviate judicial fears of ex parte proceedings is a question that future litigation will resolve; but the
courts should not attempt to avoid the problem by denying in
camera inspection entirely.
The decision that offers the most helpful clue to how the
05
courts will react to the FOIA amendments is Wolfe v. Froehlke.
There the district court refused to order disclosure of contested
documents, joint British-American files which the United States
was willing to declassify though the United Kingdom was not.
On appeal, the plaintiff asked the court to defer its decision
pending enactment of the FOIA amendments. The court of appeals refused, declaring that "in camera review could add nothing
relevant to the determination of this case."' 10 6 Whether disclosure
would indeed have been unwise under the circumstances is not
important to decide here. What is significant is that the court
rejected the opportunity to inspect the documents, even though
it would have had the express statutory authority to do so had it
deferred its decision for one month. The court's failure to
analyze the Government's claim that foreign policy considerations precluded disclosure under the first exemption in light of
the actual content of the files suggests that minimal in camera
inspection is the path courts may choose to follow in the future.
Before concluding, however, that the FOIA amendments
will have no effect on the judicial attitude toward national security classification cases, it must be pointed out that in the four
areas discussed above the courts did not have an explicit congressional mandate to become involved in executive decisionmaking. Given Congress' specific authorization of in camera review in the FOIA amendments, the courts should feel compelled
to depart from their traditional deference to the Executive and
exercise their own independent judgment when litigants allege
improper classification.
III. THE APPROPRIATENESS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
The FOIA amendments embody Congress' explicit and unambiguous intent to involve the judiciary more intimately with
agency decisions to invoke the national security exemption. The
broad scope of review granted to the courts by the amendments
marks a substantial departure from the traditional reluctance of
the Subcomm. on AdministrativePractice and Procedureof the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 108 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings].
115Civil No. 73-1913 (D.C. Cir., Oct. 23, 1974), aff'g 358 F. Supp. 1318 (D.D.C.
1973).
106Id.

at 3.

1975]

NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE FOIA

the judiciary to decide questions involving foreign affairs and
national security. How appropriate is judicial review in this context? Since the Supreme Court's landmark decision in United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,107 the lower federal courts

have accorded considerable deference to the Executive's conduct
of foreign affairs. In Curtiss-Wright, the Court held that the President is "the sole organ of the federal government in the field of
international relations." 10 8 The courts accordingly limited the
scope of judicial review when foreign affairs questions were
presented.109
The courts have traditionally invoked four principles to explain their reluctance to decide cases involving foreign affairs.
First, certain legal issues are "political" rather than judicial, and
are therefore better suited-constitutionally and practically-to
resolution by one of the other branches of government. This is
the "political question" doctrine. Second, courts argue that judicial proceedings would jeopardize the secrecy that is needed to
conduct foreign relations. Third, courts reason that agencies,
with their highly developed expertise, are well qualified to make
foreign policy decisions and should be accorded a great deal of
deference within their realm of expertise. Fourth, courts offer
their own institutional infirmities and, in particular, their lack of
expertise in foreign affairs, as a reason not to interfere.
The courts' reluctance to make decisions affecting foreign
policy has left decisionmaking almost exclusively with administrative agencies. This Comment submits that examination of the
four justifications reveals that a broader scope of review is called
for.
A.

PoliticalQuestion Analysis

One way that courts have avoided foreign affairs issues is to
treat them as political questions, beyond the scope of judicial
299 U.S. 304 (1936).
108
Id. at 320.
109Id. at 319-22. Justice Sutherland analyzed the origin of presidential powers in
foreign affairs in an historical context and concluded that the President's powers do not
depend on an affirmative grant of authority from the Constitution. The Constitution
carved out federal authority from that of the states; because the states never had international powers, these powers must have passed directly from the British Crown to the
federal government when the colonies separated from England.
Justice Sutherland's analysis is criticized in Lofgren, United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corporation:An HistoricalReassessment, 83 YALE L.J. 1 (1973). Professor Lofgren
concludes: "If good history is a requisite to good constitutional law, then Curtiss-Wright
ought to be relegated to history." Id. 32. See also Berger, The Presidential Monopoly of
Foreign Relations, 71 MICH. L. Rev. 1, 26-33 (1972).
107
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competence. In Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman
Steamship Corp.,11 ° the Supreme Court held that
the very nature of executive decisions as to foreign policy is political, not judicial ....
They are decisions of a
kind for which the Judiciary has neither aptitude,
facilities nor responsibility and which has long been
held to belong in the domain of political power not
subject to judicial intrusion or inquiry."'
Courts that have been requested to plunge into the thicket of
national security issues frequently invoke the language and spirit
2
of Waterman as a justification for non-involvement."
The classic definition of a nonjusticiable political question
comes from Baker v. Carr.13 There the Supreme Court, per
Justice Brennan, set forth two principal rationales for judicial
inaction. The first is that political questions lack satisfactory
criteria to provide the basis for a judicial determination; the
second is that "the nonjusticiability of a political question is
primarily a function of the separation of powers.""14 Neither of
these two rationales, however, is applicable to foreign affairs
issues under the FOIA as amended.
The absence of standards is not a problem under the
amendments. The new legislation provides that the court must
determine whether a document has in fact been properly classified according to the criteria established by executive order or
statute."15 The criteria set forth, then, serve as a standard for the
court. For example, Executive Order 11,652, promulgated by
President Nixon, provides that "[t]he test for assigning 'Top
Secret' classification shall be whether its unauthorized disclosure
could reasonably be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security.""16 The Order then lists five examples of what would constitute "exceptionally grave damage" and
110333 U.S. 103 (1948).
"'Id. at 111.
112E.g., Curran v. Laird, 420 F.2d 122, 129 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Harrington v.
Schlesinger, 373 F. Supp. 1138, 1140 (E.D.N.C. 1974); see Oetjen v. Central Leather
Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918).
113 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
"I Id. at 210. Accord, Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 454-55 (1939): "In determining whether a question falls within [the political question] category, the appropriateness
under our system of government of attributing finality to the action of the political
departments and also the lack of satisfactory criteria for a judicial determination are
dominant considerations."
'15Pub. L. No. 93-502 (Nov. 21, 1974), 88 Stat. 1561 (1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 5758), amending 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970).
116 Exec. Order No. 11,652, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1974).
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concludes with a caveat: "This classification shall be used with
the utmost restraint."1 1 7 Although this language is quite broad
and leaves considerable room for discretion, it is nonetheless a
standard to guide the court."18 Courts are frequently called upon
to make discriminating decisions of comparable difficulty.
The political question issue came up during congressional
debate over the FOIA amendments. Senator Hruska suggested
that the issues that would arise under the amendments would
raise the same sort of political problems as a case involving termination of a treaty, a classic example of the political question
problem. The Senator stated that the decision whether classified
documents should be disclosed is a political judgment requiring
the consideration of on-going negotiations, timeliness, and the
disclosure of other information. "Who is in a better position to
make this judgment," the Senator inquired, "-the Secretary of
State or a district judge?" ' 9
The Senator's rhetorical question misses the point. Agencies
admittedly have more experience and expertise in a particular
area than courts. The role of the court is not to usurp the function of an agency head, but to weigh the strength of his arguments against those of the litigant requesting disclosure, to determine whether the former has properly exercised his authority
under the relevant law.
Since the Waterman decision, courts have become more willing to examine questions implicating foreign affairs matters and
to determine whether the Executive has exceeded his statutory
authority.12 0 As the Supreme Court noted in Baker v. Carr:
There are sweeping statements to the effect that all
questions touching foreign relations are political ques7

11 Id. 340. The five examples are:

armed hostilities against the United States or its allies; disruption of foreign
relations vitally affecting the national security; the compromise of vital national
defense plans or complex cryptologic and communications intelligence systems;
the revelation of sensitive intelligence operations; and the disclosure of scientific
or technological developments vital to the national security.
Id. The order also provides standards for the other levels of classification.
218 The order sets forth both substantive and procedural guidelines to direct the
court in its inquiry. For example, the order forbids classification to conceal inefficiency or
administrative error, or to prevent embarrassment to a person or department. Each
classified document must indicate whether it is exempt from the automatic declassification schedule; it must show the office of origin and date of classification; and, to the
extent possible, the document should be marked to indicate which of its parts are not
classified. Id. 343.
219 120 CONG. REC. S9323 (daily ed. May 30, 1974) (remarks of Senator Hruska).
120 For a discussion of the erosion of the Waterman Doctrine, see Miller, The Waterman Doctrine Revisited, 54 GEo. L.J. 5 (1965).
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.Yet it is error to suppose that every case or

controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond
judicial cognizance. Our cases in this field seem invariably to show a discriminating analysis of the particular
question posed, in terms of the history of its management by the political branches, of its susceptibility to
judicial handling in the light of its nature and posture
and of the possible consequences of
in the specific case,
21
judicial action.'
The second and more significant rationale for the political
question doctrine is the separation of powers. The theory is that
the Executive can only function effectively in an area like foreign
affairs, committed to him by the Constitution, if he can operate
undisturbed by the courts. For example, the power to recognize
a foreign government 122 or the authority to grant sovereign
immunity1 23 belongs essentially to the executive branch.
It has been argued that the separation of powers doctrine
limits judicial review of national security classifications as a matter of constitutional law. In his message explaining the veto of
the FOIA amendments, President Ford said that the de novo
review provision "would violate constitutional principles, and
give less weight before the courts to an executive determination
involving the protection of our most vital national defense interests than is accorded determinations involving routine regulatory matters.'1 24 President Ford's position was that the decision

to classify a document and withhold disclosure can be exercised
properly only by the Chief Executive, because the Constitution
vests in him the authority to25conduct foreign relations and
maintain the national defense.

U.S. 186, 211 (1962) (citation omitted).
122 E.g., United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230 (1942).
122E.g., Spacil v. Crowe, 489 F.2d 614, 617-18 (5th Cir. 1974), in which the court
observed: "Separation-of-powers principles impel a reluctance in the judiciary to interfere with or embarrass the executive in its constitutional role as the nation's primary
organ of international policy." Id. at 619.
124 VETO MESSAGE, supra note 50. Although it is true that de novo review of the
classification decision goes beyond the scope of review generally engaged in by a court in
regulatory cases, the regulatory decisions are usually the product of hearings generously
laden with procedural safeguards. The decision to classify a document may be made
casually by a single government employee. For a discussion of the scope of review ordinarily applied by the courts in administrative cases, see DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TEXT § 29 (3d ed. 1972).
125 Senator Hruska supported the President's views during debate in Congress over
whether to override the presidential veto. 120 CONG. REc. S19813 (daily ed. Nov. 21,
1974) (remarks of Senator Hruska). See Comment, Developments Under the Freedom of
Information Act-1973, 1974 DUKE L.J. 251, 258-59.
121 369
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The separation of powers doctrine, however, does not require that the Executive exercise unchecked power in the area of
foreign affairs. The purpose of the doctrine is to preserve the
integrity of the three branches of government and to ensure
each branch's independence. 1 26 It does not require absolute deference to the Executive's decisions when the Executive has decided to withhold a document that does not contain diplomatic
27
or military secrets.1
The courts, as the President acknowledged, 12 have some
role to play in the classification system. The real issue, according
29
to Professor Kurland, is the appropriate scope of that role.'
Congress, in enacting the FOIA amendments, determined that
the Executive must be bound by his own criteria, that is, that
documents must be properly classified in accordance with the
applicable standards. The President believes that the classification must be upheld if the decision is merely reasonable. Both
the President and Congress assume that judicial review is appropriate; they differ only on the standard of review. Professor
Kurland concludes, "I do not see how it is possible to say that the
Presidential position is constitutional but the Congressional position unconstitutional."'1 30 In both cases courts have the power to
overrule the Executive.
Whether constitutionally compelled or not, the political
question doctrine does not preclude review of classification decisions as authorized by the new legislation. The amendments
provide enough safeguards and standards that judicial review of
classification decisions will not impede the Executive in the discharge of his constitutional functions. The doctrine may not be
constitutionally compelled at all, but rather a matter of judicial
prudence. Even if based on the concept of separation of powers,
The precept that federal courts do not decide political questions does not arise . . .from the text of the
Constitution.... The political question doctrine limits
the exercise, not the existence, of federal judicial power.
Thus, even though a dispute may constitutionally be
'26 See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 291-95 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
127See Developments in the Law-The National Security Interest and Civil Liberties, 83
HARV. L. REV. 1130, 1219 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Developments-NationalSecurity]. Cf.
Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 788, 793-94 (D.C. Cir.
1971).
128 VETO MESSAGE, supra note 50.
129 Letter from Philip B. Kurland to Senator Muskie, Nov. 15, 1974, in CONG. REC.

S19602 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1974).
' 30 Id. 603.
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subject to the judicial power, if a political question is
present, a federal court should decline to reach the
3
merits.' '
Courts often discuss impediments to deciding cases in terms of
the political question analysis, but these impediments should not
prevent review. The need for secrecy, agency expertise, and judicial incompetence in matters of foreign policy neither present political questions nor stand as practical barriers to judicial
review of agency classification decisions.
B.

The Need for Secrecy in ForeignAffairs

Secrecy is expressly provided for only once in the ConCongress is authorized not to publish those porstitution:'
tions of the journal of its proceedings that it determines must be
kept secret.' 3 3 Nevertheless, secrecy has been invoked by the
Executive throughout the nation's history as necessary
to the
34
proper fulfillment of the foreign affairs function.
The courts have recognized the need for executive secrecy
in the conduct of foreign relations and the preservation of national defense and have declined to review executive decisions in
these areas.' 3 5 In Spacil v. Crowe,13 6 the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit refused to review, even for "reasonableness," the
State Department's decision to grant sovereign immunity to
Cuba in litigation between the Cuban government and a Chilean
corporation. The Court remarked, "It is the legitimate role of
secrecy in foreign relations which, more than any other factor,
distinguishes executive decisions directly concerning foreign policy from other agency action and makes judicial review peculiarly inappropriate in the foreign instance.' 3 7 Although courts
do not separate the need for secrecy from the Executive's need
to function freely in the foreign affairs area, the problem of
secrecy presents practical difficulties regardless of the presence
or absence of a nonjusticiable political question.13 8 Certainly secrecy plays an important role in the conduct of foreign affairs.
131Atleev. Laird, 347 F. Supp. 689,701 (E.D. Pa. 1972),aff'dpercuriamsub nom. Atlee
v. Schlesinger, 411 U.S. 911 (1973).
132EXECUTIVE CLASSIFICATION, supra note 16, at 3.
13 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 5, cl. 3.
134

See EXECUTIVE CLASSIFCATION, supra note 16, at 3.

135 Cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710-11 (1974).
136489 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974).
37

'

Id. at 620.

""See Developments-National Security, supra note 127, at 1215-17; cf. Committee for
Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 788, 793-94 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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Secrecy allows for minimal defense security; it encourages candor in foreign relations and permits flexibility in negotiations
with foreign governments and expression of internal opposition
without the fear of fragmenting government policy. Maintaining
secrecy in government, however, imposes substantial costs on a
democracy, which requires that citizens be educated in matters
concerning the operation of their government. 139 Withholding
information vests unbridled control in the Executive, creates a
credibility gap between government and the governed, and provides the Government with an opportunity to use "leaks" to disclose only as much information as it deems useful, even
though
140
partial disclosure may substantially distort the truth.
The amendments to the FOIA attempt to balance these
competing considerations. Information that would indeed compromise the nation's foreign plicy or defense will not be released,
except to the courts for in camera review. All the amendments
effectively do is to shift control of that balance away from the
Executive, who may have a vested interest in the outcome, to the
judiciary, which can independently judge the need for secrecy in
any particular case.
C. Agency Expertise

The courts have recognized that the Executive has a special
expertise in the area of foreign affairs and have tended to defer
to his judgment in these sensitive areas.' 4 1 The agency classifying
a document is likely to have a broad understanding of the significance of its decision in the larger context of a defense
strategy or comprehensive foreign policy.' 4 2 The court will only

have access to the particular data involved in the litigation. Ex-

139 James Madison once wrote:

A popular Government, without popular information, or the means of acquiring
it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both. Knowledge will
forever govern ignorance: And a people who mean to be their own Governors,
must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives.
Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry, Aug. 4, 1822, 9 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON
103 (Hunt ed. 1910), quoted in EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 110-11 (1973) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
140 For a general discussion of the costs and benefits of open government, see Franck
& Weisband, Executive Secrecy in Three Democracies:The Parametersof Reform in SECRECY IN
FOREIGN POLICY 3 (T. Franck & E. Weisband eds. 1974). The problem of unauthorized
leaks resulting from too much secrecy is discussed in EXECUTIVE CLASSInICATION, supra
note 16, at 16.
141 See generally notes 107-12 supra & accompanying text.
42 See, e.g., U.S. v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1318 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1063 (1972).
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clusive reliance on the agency's decision, however, is unwise. 1 4 3
According to a 1973 report by the House Committee on Government Operations, the security
classification system has been
1 44
subject to considerable abuse.
First, the number of agency bureaucrats authorized to classify documents is overwhelming. It has been estimated that
55,000 federal employees have the authority to stamp a document "confidential"; more than 18,000 are authorized to use the
"secret" stamp; and nearly 3,000 bureaucrats can classify a
document "top secret."' 45 Thousands of government employees,
each familiar with only a small part of a broad national strategy
or policy, are authorized to classify documents and remove them
from public inspection. A federal judge is no less capable of
perceiving broader issues than an intermediate-level agency employee working on a narrow aspect of a complex problem. At
least the judge can require the agency to submit an explanation
for the classification decision.
A second problem with the security classification system is
the enormous number of documents that have been classified
over the years. Although no one can give a precise count, some
estimates have been startling. The Department of Defense alone,
according to one expert, may have more than twenty million
classified documents in its files,14 6 which are estimated to take up
seventeen percent of the six million cubic feet of active Pentagon
file space.' 4 7 That there are so many classified documents does
not in itself imply abuse. It suggests, however, that classification
is not reserved for the most definitively sensitive cases. Agency
experts agree that many classified documents 48could be disclosed
now without compromising national defense.
Classification experts have offered examples of the overclasSee EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. at 94-95 (Stewart, J., concurring).
144The scope of the problem is set forth in EXECUTIVE CLASSIFICATION, supra note
16, at 32-5 1.
143

45

1 Id. 33.

146
Id. 34-35.
147 Id. 35. Congressman Ogden Reid has calculated that the number of documents
classified by the Defense Department "equals 18 stacks of documents 555 feet high, each
as high as the Washington Monument." Id. 36.
The National Archives estimates that for the period from the beginning of the
Second World War through the end of the Korean War it has in its possession approximately 470 million pages of classified documents. A substantial number of documents
have been classified since the Korean War but have not yet been delivered to the Archives, so this half-billion-page figure largely underestimates the total number of documents classified to date. Id. 37.
148One Defense Department expert said that in his opinion disclosure of more than
99% of the classified documents would not jeopardize national defense. Id. 34.
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sification phenomenon. When one of the Chiefs of Staff wrote a
memorandum suggesting that use of the "top secret" classification stamp be reduced, the memorandum itself was stamped
"top secret" by the Pentagon, as if to bear him out. 14 9 Frequently
the military classifies collections of documents, none of which
would be classified if published separately. Such classification is
explained by the following kind of statement: "Each section of
this volume is in itself unclassified, to [sic] protect the compilation of information contained in the complete volume, the complete volume is confidential."' 5 0
The FOIA amendments are designed to correct these kinds
of classification abuses. Unless a judge is given the power to
review the documents and the justification for the classification,
overclassification passes unnoticed. If 55,000 bureaucrats can be
trusted not to disclose confidential information, so can the federal judiciary.
D. JudicialCompetence
In Curranv. Laird, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit held that the judiciary had neither the "aptitude, facilities, nor responsibility" to review foreign affairs
questions.' 5 ' It has long been argued that courts are not
equipped to resolve the complex issues that arise in the foreign
affairs area. President Ford expressed these concerns in his
52
veto message.'
Congress was aware of the lack of judicial expertise in the
53
foreign affairs area when it passed the FOIA amendments,
but it did not find the problem insurmountable.'5 The Senate
Judiciary Committee specifically concluded:
The judgments involved may often be delicate and
difficult ones, but someone other than interested
parties-officials with power to classify and conceal
information-must be empowered to make them. It is
149
Id. 46. Other examples of less than discriminating use of classification authority
included the classification of newspaper articles, generally available research studies, and
Russian history lessons taught to Air Force trainees.
150
Id.48.
151420 F.2d 122, 129 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (quoting Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman
Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948)).
152 VETO MESSAGE, supra note 50.
153 Senator Kennedy asked several witnesses during the course of the Senate hearings whether they felt that the federal judiciary would be able to deal competently with
the national security problems that would arise in cases challenging classification decisions. Senate Hearings,supra note 104.
154 See text accompanying note 52 supra.
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the committee's conclusion55 that the courts are qualified
to make such judgments.

The committee suggested that courts make use of special masters
or expert consultants to aid them
in making what may often be
56
sophisticated determinations.1
Courts are frequently called upon to make difficult judgments on complex subjects. 157 With no special expertise in
economics, physics, or engineering, courts resolve intricate factual disputes in antitrust, environmental, and patent cases. They
can perform the same function when foreign affairs issues are
raised in classification cases. A court is not being asked to determine the wisdom of granting sovereign immunity or of recognizing a foreign government. Rather, the court is required only to
examine the executive decision in terms of the Executive's own
158
criteria.
E.

Summary: The Need for Judicial Review

The standard objections to anything but the most limited
judicial review do not render review under the FOIA amendments inappropriate. Although the amendments expand the
traditional role of the courts in the area of foreign affairs, the
courts should be able to meet the challenge. The relevant executive orders set forth standards to guide the courts; actual need
for secrecy will not be compromised; agency expertise will prevail when the agency explains its position to the court; and
judges will develop their own expertise in handling these matters
as they have in other complex areas of litigation.
IV.

CONCLUSION: THE RISING DISSENT

"Security," Justice Jackson once wrote, "is like liberty in that
many are the crimes committed in its name."'15 9 National security
has been used too readily to thwart judicial examination of executive decisions, and Justice Jackson is not alone in his recogni,5-S. REP. No. 854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1974).
15 6
Id. But see Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 788,
794-95 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1971), where the court suggested the use of a governmentappointed expert to aid the judge in analyzing the documents. See also Vaughn v.
Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 828 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977 (1974), noted in 122
U. PA. L. REv. 731 (1974).
157See generally Developments-NationalSecurity, supra note 127, at 1225.
' See note 115 supra & accompanying text.
159 United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 551 (1950) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting).
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tion of the abuses to which the national security label has been
subjected.
The deference traditionally accorded by courts to the Executive in national security matters has prompted a consistent
series of lively dissents. Congress clearly feels that the time has
come to adopt what has historically been the dissenting position
and to encourage courts to assume a more vigorous role in
foreign affairs issues, specifically with regard to the declassification of national security documents. To predict how the courts
will respond to the FOIA amendments is difficult, as the courts
are afforded a considerable amount of discretion in the use of
their new powers. Some executive agencies seem to sense that
the new legislation will have a substantial impact on their ability
to withhold information. Shortly after passage of the FOIA
amendments, for example, high officials in the Central Intelligence Agency tried to destroy controversial documents which
they feared could now be seen by the public. 160
Recent events have engendered a growing concern about
covert national security operations conducted by FBI, CIA, and
White House operatives. Congressional committees and blue
ribbon commissions have assumed responsibility for unraveling
the complex threads of foreign and domestic intelligence
operations. 16 1 Congress, by enacting the FOIA amendments over
a presidential veto, has determined that the courts, too, should
play a role.
The courts can provide a useful forum for examining some
of the issues raised by national security claims. Judges, insulated
from political pressures and forces, can serve as impartial arbiters of government claims and public demands. To the extent
that disclosure of government documents will not jeopardize the
national security, the adversary system can serve as a valuable
tool for determining the validity of government claims.
Although the courts have never shown an inclination to involve themselves with national security issues, the courts have
never had a specific mandate such as the one in the FOIA
amendments. The mandate comes at a timely moment in history,
as the nation reevaluates presidential power in the aftermath of
Watergate and public concern begins to focus on the federal
government's national security apparatus. If the courts rise to
the challenge, they will play an important role in protecting the
national security without sacrificing the public's right to know.
160 N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1975, at 1, col. 1.
161 N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1975, § 4, at 1, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1975, at 1, col. 1.

